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1 Introduction: the ‘secret’ of China’s recent economic growth 
China has known an impressive 8% annual growth in recent years and its GDP has been 
multiplied by seven in the last 23 years. Still, the size of the country blurs the 
extraordinary diversity of situations. The recent growth began after the reform period, 
and relied on three waves of investment, creating a multiplicity of companies and a whole 
new emerging economy (Arvanitis et al., 2003). Much of China’s economic development 
is due to its industrial growth. The Chinese economy is still export-driven and relies 
heavily on foreign investment. But the growth process relies mainly on Chinese-owned 
and Chinese-managed companies (Gregory et al., 2000). The private sector represented 
1.8 million ‘private enterprises’ (seyin qiye) in 1998. State-owned enterprises represent 
more than 1.6 million (Guiheux, 2002,p.30), and today, state-owned enterprises can be 
‘privately managed’ (minying). 
Nowadays a lot of discussion is taking place on the reasons and sustainability of the 
growth process. Is this growth possible in other countries in Asia or elsewhere such as 
Latin America? How exceptional is this growth, that is, how much of it can be 
understood as being specific to the political conditions of China (a former communist 
country, a ‘transition economy’, a very large economy dominated by the state or any 
other qualification) and the specific ‘advantages’ of this country (low labour cost, easy 
and rapid administrative process for the registration of a new business, sizable markets)?  
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In this article, instead of looking at the macroeconomic conditions, we will 
investigate the learning process of Chinese companies and their relations to external 
sources of technology. Our cases are located in Guangdong province in the South of 
China (more than 36% of China’s exports and 14% of China’s production), a region 
which has been ‘one step ahead’ in the modernisation process of China, and still the 
largest receiver of foreign capital (Cheng, 2003). The ‘miracle’ of South China 
industrialisation is based on the creation of industrial private or privately managed 
enterprises, and mainly of small- and medium-sized enterprises. China has not  
been active in creating large enterprises, and state-owned firms did not transform into 
Korean-style chaebols (Huchet, 1999; Huchet and Richet, 2004). Guangdong’s initial 
development relied on the combination of two types of enterprises: productive units 
employing unskilled, mainly immigrant labour force funded by foreign capital (mainly 
from Hong Kong and Taiwan); and, small industrial units created by local entrepreneurs 
(Chan, 2003). This combination of local and overseas Chinese enterprises created an 
impressive web of industrial companies, making of Guangdong and, more specifically, 
the Pearl River delta, a region that has achieved one of the fastest growth rates in the 
world.  
Comparisons at the macroeconomic level were not able to detect the formidable 
entrepreneurial force behind growth. Comparing other Asian economies where salaries 
are lower than China will convince the readers that low salaries are not a suitable 
explanation. Other explanations like the cultural and geographic proximity of Hong 
Kong, the specific labour culture of China, the relatively high educational level of its 
population, the business-minded networks of friendship and guangxi (Hendrischke, 
2004), may also have their part. However, if these were sufficient explanations, then 
Guangdong’s development would have been easily foreseen. This was not the case:  
25 years ago nobody thought Guangdong would become ‘the factory of the world’. We 
believe that a good way to understand the South China miracle is to look at the 
technological learning of firms, rather than the entrepreneurial behaviour as a whole 
(Krug, 2004; Guiheux, 2002; 2003). 
2 Technological learning of latecomer companies 
Since the seminal work on technological learning in the developing world of Jorge Katz 
and Alice Amsden, a lot of the work has focused on South Korea and Taiwan on the 
theory of late industrialisation, the role of the state, and the creation of international value 
chains. A theory of the necessary steps to upgrade and attain a certain level of 
technological development has emerged (Kim, 1997; Hobday, 1995). Observing the 
Taiwanese electronics industry, Hobday (1997) predicted a continuous upgrading from 
simple suppliers, Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) to own brand manufacturers. 
Dutrénit (2000) draws attention to the importance of the transition process from building 
the minimum knowledge base to building strategic capabilities in latecomer firms.  
Technological learning has been at the centre of these discussions, so much so that 
some authors propose to replace the concept of National System of Innovation by that of 
National System of Technological Learning (Mathews, 1999). Technological learning is 
seen as a structural feature that goes hand-in-hand with some special institutional 
arrangements (Kim, 1997). Learning and achievement in general have been seen as 
underlying features of Asian societies (Rowen, 1998). There has been an impressive 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Technological learning in six firms in Southern China 111    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
number of studies centred on issues like the national innovation system, institutions, and 
the overall environmental conditions of industrialisation (see, for instance, Lall, 1998; 
Chen and Sewell, 1996; Shin, 1996). Indeed, some studies such as Gereffi (1999) and 
Ernst and Kim (2002) have been sought to understand the subcontracting process in East 
Asian economies, and the creation of global chains of supply. In one such analysis of the 
Taiwanese electronics industry (Ernst, 2000,p.224) emphasise the diversity of linkages 
between subcontractors, foreign clients and providers of technology: 
“International linkages include a variety of ties with sales, manufacturing, and 
engineering support affiliates of foreign firms; they also include different forms 
and trajectories of integration into global production networks of American and 
Japanese electronics firms. Taiwanese firms typically have relied on concurrent 
knowledge outsourcing: they have pursued different approaches in parallel, 
rather than concentrating exclusively on one particular linkage.” 
Very much in line with this work, we stress that technological upgrading in China has 
followed a diversified pattern, and entrepreneurs have always kept a variety of 
technology sources, not so much because of some strategy, but rather out of an immediate 
and pragmatic need to be resolved: the access to technology. In the absence of previous 
experiences, local firms relied on their foreign clients, rather than some public knowledge 
provider, or other external sources of technical advice. This may not appear new to the 
Asian literature; it nonetheless is the actual industrialisation process in China: 
technological learning is taking place in a large variety of medium-sized companies, not 
so much through technology transfers from foreign firms that invest in China (inward 
FDI) or through some other providers such as universities, technical centres or 
consultants, but through their foreign clients.  
3 Understanding technological learning in firms 
The fieldwork for this study is based on a variety of firms. They represent different types 
of the emerging production system in South China. Technological learning is a 
cumulative process over time, very specific to each firm, and collective in the sense that 
it involves more than one person inside the company (Arvanitis and Villavicencio, 1998; 
Figueiredo, 2002). Economists have used the notions of ‘production capabilities’ and 
‘technological capabilities’ in order to differentiate two resulting paths of technological 
learning, particularly in the developing countries (Bell and Pavitt, 1995). These terms 
encapsulate the notion of ‘absorptive capacity’ introduced by Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990), in that an enterprise needs to develop sufficient capabilities that permit absorbing 
of the new technologies. Nevertheless, it should be reminded that Cohen and Levinthal 
only discussed the case of rather large and sophisticated economies, and gave a particular 
importance to R&D. As the literature showed, learning cannot be reduced to R&D, even 
if it is an essential component. Moreover, R&D is not linked to production or the market 
in a linear and simple way (Rosenberg et al., 1992). The existence of an R&D unit is not 
limited to some large R&D facility with specific research projects; R&D’s functions can 
be much wider, supporting the whole productive process, particularly in small and 
medium enterprises where it is frequently undercounted (see Arvanitis and Vonortas, 
2000; Acs and Audretsch, 1991; Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1991). R&D, in fact, affects 
the strategic capability and thus we try in the interviews to understand what is called an 
R&D unit in each company.  
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   112 R. Arvanitis, W. Zhao, H. Qiu and J. Xu    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
An empirical description of technological learning would identify two types of 
activities: those that permit the enhancement of products and processes inside the 
enterprise (internal learning), and activities with the same purpose but in relation to 
clients, suppliers, and external sources of knowledge (external or interactive learning) 
(Pirela et al., 1993; Arvanitis, 2000). Internal learning includes activities such as: seeking 
technological information on alternative technological routes, adaptation of technology, 
development of better and new products and adaptation and design of processes. Product 
and process innovations, strictly speaking, are part of this learning experience as well as 
R&D, design, engineering, maintenance, and quality management. External or interactive 
learning activities can take a very wide variety of forms. Table 1 summarises those 
external relations that are related to a foreign provider of technology, and their impact on 
the creation of technological capabilities. 
Table 1 Effects of different forms of international technology transfers on technological 
learning (external learning) 
Technology transfers modes Effects on technological learning 
Sales of equipment with technical 
documentation for installation 
The interaction is a market relation. The supplier offers little support, 
and there is no learning by interaction. This relation is not favourable 
for tacit knowledge. 
Technology transfer contract, with 
the license of the technology, 
technical assistance, engineering, 
production assessment, 
management contract, all inclusive 
contracts 
The relation is a hierarchical relation, based on the structure of the 
market. Depending on the nature of the contract, the suppliers can be 
active and learning by interaction can happen. Many contracts prohibit 
explicitly certain types of learning procedures (no copying, no 
adaptation permitted, no enhancements). Tacit knowledge can be 
acquired depending on the degree of interaction with engineers on  
the floor. 
Contract with a client (less formal, 
long-term relation with client) 
The relation is market-based and unstable. No formal technology 
transfer but the suppliers of technology are final clients, transmitting 
quality specifications and productive procedures. Usually, engineer or 
technical personnel installs and checks quality procedures. Favourable 
for tacit learning. 
Subcontracting, co-production, 
OEM or ODM 
Hierarchical relation between users and providers, even if some element 
of market is included. The longer the relation is, overtime, the more 
active are suppliers (they transmit larger parts of their know-how). 
Specific mechanisms in order to grow the value chain are devised (for 
example learning by monitoring, design proposals, quality checks) 
where user firm can upgrade by interacting on a more permanent basis 
with their suppliers. Non-exclusive contracts are a bonus for the user 
company. Favourable for tacit knowledge. 
Foreign direct investment: all kinds 
of joint ventures, contractual 
common enterprise 
Hierarchical relation between providers and users of technology. 
Providers will be more active depending on the degree of their 
investment. The larger their financial investment, the more intense is 
their effort. Internalised relation similar to that between a subsidiary and 
headquarters. Technological learning is a process controlled by the 
headquarters. If the mother firm is willing, the affiliates will learn a lot. 
Usually the local firm gives access to market and gets technology in 
exchange. Could be very favourable for tacit learning. 
Strategic alliances, R&D alliances, 
technological cooperations (rare in 
developing countries) 
The relations are an organised market. Providers and users share 
competencies and have complementary abilities. Both parts are active. 
Tacit knowledge is acquired from both sides. 
Note: Based on Tidd et al. (1997), Richet and Huchet (2000) and author’s own field-work. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Technological learning in six firms in Southern China 113    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Companies that upgrade from productive capabilities to technological capabilities 
combine internal and interactive learning and, as their experience evolves, they enter a 
more complex organisational learning. This latter ‘soft’ skill has mostly interested the 
business management literature mainly on joint ventures. The substantial management 
literature on joint ventures or foreign companies in China is focused on management 
issues (Peng and Luo, 2000), investment decisions (Shi, 2001) and, in some cases, on 
technology transfers (Wang et al., 2001; Martinsons and Tseng, 1999; Walsh, 2003). The 
same issues are less commonly studied in Chinese-owned companies (with some 
exceptions like: White and Liu, 1998; Zhao, 2000; Xie, 2003; Xie and Wu, 2003).1 
4 Sample selection and methods 
We briefly describe here the experience of six different firms in South China. They were 
selected though a process of 46 interviews. The selection is based on our qualitative 
appreciation of the ‘typical’ character of the cases representing what we have called ‘the 
emerging industrial sector’ of South China: a large sport shoemaker Taiwanese joint 
venture (hereafter named TL) inserted in a global value chain, a medium-sized packaging 
joint venture with an industrialised country partner (CB), a small private Chinese 
enterprise oriented toward export (CZ), a small private Chinese company oriented mainly 
toward the national market (HY), a slightly larger collective-owned company in a 
traditional sector (WG), and a middle-sized collective company in electro-domestics (JL). 
Their histories and strategic orientations illustrate the wide range of strategies that we 
found on the ground. Large firms and high-tech firms were not included. Indeed, this type 
of firms deserves a specific treatment (Arvanitis, 2004). The interview guide sought to 
capture the history of the company, the linkages with providers of technology and clients, 
the insertion into the local policy and economy, internal management of manpower and 
quality, and the general strategy of the firm. Each interview lasted around one-and-a-half 
hours. Some interviews were followed by a factory tour. Interviews were also made in 
eight innovation centres among 38 companies in Guangdong on the management of 
innovation, management issues of the centres and relations between companies in 
industrial clusters (reported in Arvanitis and Qiu, 2004).  
5 Findings on six empirical cases 
Key evidence related to the researched firms is described in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Six examples of relations of Chinese enterprises with foreign clients 
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Table 2 Six examples of relations of Chinese enterpises with foreign clients (continued) 
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5.1 TL: a Taiwanese shoe producer in China 
TL is a typical company created by ‘overseas Chinese’ from Taiwan. It was established 
in Nanhai, an industrial city near Guangzhou, where the shoe industry has been supported 
by local government. TL is a shoe-producing company quite strong in Taiwan, which has 
some 15 factories in Mainland China, all based on the production of sports shoes 
exclusively for foreign clients. TL, which employs about 3000 workers, produces sports 
shoes for Italian and North American brands. No foreign client has exclusive production 
in this factory. The factory is fit for the international market; it can produce for any large 
brand of sports shoes in the world. Containers are loaded inside the factory and shipped 
to the port of Nanhai.  
TL has OEM arrangements with its principal clients and very stable contracts over 
time. The clients have permanent representatives located inside the factory for quality 
checks and production procedures supervision. The firm has a testing and experimental 
so-called ‘R&D unit’, which proposes new models to clients, mostly variations of 
previous models. In fact, the multinational brands rely more and more on these OEM 
providers for low-end changes in design. The cost of design is normally low because 
designers have low wages. The factory has a good competence in testing quality, an 
essential feature in this trade. Feasibility of the new designs is part of the package for 
technological learning.  
The local firm publicises its regular contacts with the international brand. In every 
office the ‘ethical rules’ of the multinational are shown, particularly as to how labour and 
human resources are managed by the multinational group. The factory seems to work as a 
subsidiary of a multinational company. This is, however, a false picture: management of 
labour and local resources is not controlled by the foreign partner. Clients only check for 
quality and timing.  
This factory is a typical example of the ‘triangle manufacturing’ depicted by Gereffi 
(1999,p.60) in the apparel and textile industry where: 
“The US buyers place their orders with the (Taiwan or Hong Kong) 
manufacturers they have sourced from in the past, who in turn shift some or all 
of the requested production to affiliated offshore factories in low-wage 
countries (e.g., China, Indonesia or Vietnam).” 
5.2 CB: successful JV of a multinational with a city authority 
We can contrast the case of FDI made by the Taiwanese-owned company with this 
French multinational. CB is one of the largest packaging producers in the world. The 
multinational set up a joint venture with a company owned by a local government, the 
only legal form for foreign investment at that time. 
On entering the market, they also were looking for immediate profitability, which 
arose from fully exploiting the market of the already existing company with which it 
formed the JV, and a strong and growing local market. A totally new investment was 
done to serve exclusively a US multinational, leader of cosmetics, soaps and detergents, 
by installing high-end equipment, using exclusive design for the moulds, and maintaining 
close relationships with the equipment producers. This new production line coexisted 
with two older lines, serving different markets. 
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The existing Chinese company, says the French director, needed little reorganisation. 
Technological reordering and financial cleanup were the two priorities of the new 
management. The company is small with around 280 workers and has always been 
earning money. The JV has benefited from the management experience of the French 
owners, but on the whole, production management and personnel have been in the hands 
of the Chinese managers with long-time experience. Some technical personnel in highly 
technical areas (moulds) have benefited from long stays in factories located in France. 
Competition with Chinese companies is quite strong. To be a famous French brand is 
not sufficient to get new clients. The only stable market is the US transnational client. 
The French company has offered many times to buy the Chinese partnership, but the city 
authorities don’t want to lose a company that is earning money. 
5.3 WG: a collective enterprise in the faucets and plumbing sector 
WG is a collective enterprise, that is, a company that formally belongs partly to a 
collective body (the municipality). Most collective enterprises have been at the forefront 
of the Chinese industrialisation, later becoming famous brands (like Haier, or LeNovo). 
The particular ownership status does not seem to deter their dynamism.  
Before the reform, WG was once the only company in the city of Shuikou. It was 
dedicated to producing simple faucets made from cast iron. With the reform policy during 
the 1980s the company was challenged: some of its workers, who had been working there 
for more than 20 years, created private enterprises. Faucets and plumbing in general is a 
good business when there is a construction boom, as is still the case in China. Soon many 
more companies were created by former workers of WG, which is called the ‘mother of 
all companies’ in Shuikou, but it still remains the largest company in town. Among other 
things, it is the only one that has a metal-plating facility, a highly polluting activity that is 
nonetheless an obligatory passage point in producing faucets. Collectively owned, in fact, 
does not mean ‘state-owned’ and the company is managed very much in the same way as 
in other companies in Shuikou. The technology is not so much better in WG than that in 
other companies. Additionally, the company produces along the standards that are offered 
by the foreign clients; for the local market, the company provides models for merchants.  
5.4 HY and CZ: two private SMEs in the faucets and plumbing business 
HY and CZ are both private companies created by former workers of WG in the township 
of Shuikou. HY is a young company (eight-years-old) with 300 workers, all immigrants 
from other regions of China, like all workers in the other factories around. HY is quite 
well ordered, and managed as a family business, i.e., the woman looking at the accounts,  
her husband managing the production and public relations. It is considered one of the  
best companies in the city, although the owner does not seem willing to share any 
friendship toward the authorities; ‘public authorities means taxes’, we were told. HY has 
been a better and stronger learner than many other companies we visited in the area. 
Nonetheless, the whole productive process is mainly manual. What makes the difference 
here is a stronger quality control, a better division of production tasks and a more 
efficient layout of the factory. 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   118 R. Arvanitis, W. Zhao, H. Qiu and J. Xu    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
The company has benefited from one big contract with a Spanish client. After two 
years, the client proposed a joint venture, but the Chinese entrepreneur refused. 
Following pressure from local authorities, a joint venture has been set up, but the foreign 
client is a minor shareholder (only 20%), a rare situation since most JVs are set up in a 
manner that benefits more openly the foreign partner.  
This entrepreneur never wished to lose the diversity of clients and has no exclusive 
contracts with any client. Visits of technical foreign personnel are quite frequent, but the 
quality control is not local. The case of CZ, created nine years ago, in this town of 
Shuikou, is quite different because this company is producing exclusively for the export 
market, mainly to the German market. CZ, with 200 to 250 employees, is a ‘real’ ISO 
9000 company. It has invested strongly in the ISO process and the owner and general 
manager have used the ISO system as a lever to maintain high quality. This company has 
been introducing many new products and making considerable adaptations to the 
production processes. The owner has visited professional fairs in Germany and has 
brought with him faucets which have been ‘reversed-engineered’. Technicians coming 
from client-enterprises have also inspected the company. In Europe, its production is 
considered of middle-range quality. In order to produce higher quality, investments 
would be too important. 
5.5 JL: local state-owned enterprise with strategic alliance in the  
washing machines 
JL is a local government-owned enterprise, a collective enterprise, producing washing 
machines since 1979. It started with a production of 200 machines per year and now it 
produces above one million. Today, it produces among the highest quality washing 
machines in China (sales of two billion Yuans per year, around 250 million USD, and has 
exported last year for eight million USD). Today, it is the fifth producer in China, the 
third exporter of washing machines. Recently it entered a JV with Mitsubishi for the 
production of air-conditioners, and is considering a partnership with General Electric in 
the washing machines business. 
The production of washing machines exemplifies the evolution of the Chinese 
market. The sector has been dominated rapidly by companies that today either 
disappeared or have lost their rank. A famous case is Weili, a collective company based 
in Zhongshan well known as the main producer in China. Today Weili produces less than 
20 000 cheap and obsolete units per year.  
Managers of JL explain their success by the fact that they were a relatively  
small company that did not attract the envy and greed of provincial authorities. Apart 
from this political aspect, a constant strategy based on technological learning is perhaps a 
better explanation. JL has developed good processes, high quality products, created  
an R&D unit, and kept a continuous training for its personnel. Workers here are mainly 
local people, not immigrants from other regions, and are rather well paid. It looks 
actively to create a production unit outside China: Brazil will probably be its next 
destination. JL is also an OEM for many large firms in China like Konka and TCL. These 
well-known brands produce other types of equipment like televisions, computers, and 
telephones. Washing machines under their brands are produced by JL. 
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The company has developed competencies in product design, training of human 
resources, process capabilities. It has benefited from the help of the city office of science 
and technology for developing partnerships with a local engineering school, and 
developing its R&D unit. It focused on Computer-Aided Design (CAD), a priority in 
Guangdong and also installed a GIS for sales management. Research focused on a highly 
automated system of electronic commands of the washing machines. It also designs 
specific moulds for its equipment. A cooperation with Tsinghua University, Department 
of Engineering in Beijing (among the most famous universities in China) was established, 
and with the Normal School of Beijing, the Industrial University of Harbin, and the 
Polytechnic School of South of China in Guangzhou. Some of these collaborations were 
supported by the National Programme for Science and Technology. Its investment in 
R&D has always been quite high: 4.1% in 1998 and 5.9% of its sales in 2001.  
Their strategy is to constantly produce new washing machines: new products 
represent 30% of their sales. “We want to export and be famous because of the quality of 
our products and our technological innovation”, says the general manager. JL also has a 
patent policy, a portfolio of 20 patents (of which seven are technical patents) and an 
intellectual property office, a rather unusual feature. Some patents have been extended 
abroad. The company also learned how to manage efficiently its network of suppliers. 
For example, the motors are produced outside the company and have attained a 90% rate 
of acceptance. 
Recently the company created an affiliate JV with Mitsubishi for the production of 
air-conditioners. “For Mitsubishi, the air-conditioning is a small division; for us it means 
a lot. They have among the best technology and we will learn a lot from their 
management. Our own development will benefit from this unit”. This JV is entirely 
Japanese-managed. The objective is to see how the Japanese manages their company.  
JL also entered in a partnership with General Electric (GE). Although the company 
does not show this as being of paramount importance, it is in fact a decisive step. JL was 
a supplier of GE for washing machines sold in Latin American. The technical level of the 
machines attracted the attention of GE. Now, entirely automatic machines are produced 
as an OEM arrangement with GE. The aim of JL is to have a strategic alliance with GE. 
6 Analysis of cases in a learning perspective 
We chose these six case-studies in order to highlight the relations of the companies with 
their foreign clients, because they are typical of the industrial world of Guangdong 
(Guangdong Office of Science and Technology, 2002). Table 3 summarises four models 
of learning that we could identify through these cases. The main sources of knowledge, 
except the joint venture, come from the support the client gives to the company as it 
inspects productive processes, gives the blueprints and pushes the company for higher 
quality. The client is, thus, the main provider of technology. 
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1 OEM model 
The OEM model made Taiwan famous and is well fit for a globalised industry, 
where the international brand puts the orders while the factory deals with the local 
advantages. Taiwan producers, already used to these OEM arrangements, understood 
the full advantage they could get from coming to Mainland China. Somehow 
differently, Hong Kong capitalists also came to Mainland China seeking low costs, 
transforming Hong Kong into an industrial desert. Local Chinese enterprises cannot 
access foreign clients with the same facility.  
2 Contracted provider 
The second model is very well illustrated by the Shuikou industrial cluster. It is 
particularly interesting because it concerns mature industrial sectors populated by 
SMEs, which are the main force of China’s industrial growth, and will probably still 
be for many years (Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci, 2004). The local companies are 
aching for foreign clients. “Our clients are our teachers”, said one manager. All the 
best quality producers are linked one way or another to international clients who give 
them new blueprints and propose improvements in quality. Companies become 
contracted providers for foreign clients because they have to. They also know that 
the local market will be unable to sustain today’s large quantity of producers and 
sooner or later only the best ones will survive a more competitive market (see the 
domestic consumer electronics sector in Cao, 2004).  
3 The Joint Venture (JV) model 
JVs were once thought to be the panacea of technology transfers. China has  
provided legislative effort in order to promote FDI and JVs. Foreigners are usually 
uncomfortable with the figure of the JV and most foreign companies now want to 
become wholly owned foreign enterprises, since the law is authorising this new 
possibility. In most JVs, the partnership is a forced one, not a chosen one, and 
whatever the benefits, it is always seen with suspicion. Inside the JV there is an 
important input of technological know-how, as would be the case for the subsidiary 
of a transnational firm. But all decisions in fine depend on the internal structure and 
strategy of the transnational or foreign partner.  
4 The mixed model 
This appears to be the ideal model, as exemplified by the case of JL. Other large 
companies in China, mainly collective companies, like Haier, TCL, Konka, Legend 
(now LeNovo) or Fenghua follow a similar model; these companies are not so 
numerous in China. Under this model, the company has a learning strategy based on 
technological development and high standards in production; it also develops 
collaborative R&D with outside sources of knowledge. At the same time, these 
companies also seek to become, at least partially, OEM providers. This allows for 
lower cost in entering the foreign markets, and permits to get a grip on the 
technology as well as marketing in foreign countries. As an outcome, they also try to 
set up facilities in foreign countries, a growing tendency for Chinese enterprises. 
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Table 3 A brief typology of models of interactive learning 
Model of interactive learning  Main characteristics 
OEM model Dominated by FDI, the company is inserted in the chain value. Stable 
relation, regular and long-term commitment to client. Strong productive 
learning, design capabilities. But no original design, no capacity to 
innovate strongly in models since the brand is the one which decides. 
Example: TL (Nanhai), Taiwanese shoe-maker 
Contracted provider Unstable relation to client. Strong local competition. Can be private or 
collective enterprise 
Emphasis on quality control and productive processes 
Example: enterprises in Shuikou WG, HY, CZ 
JV, subsidiary or affiliate Mainly internal learning. Transnational circuit 
Very stable relation. Example: CB 
Large local producer with OEM 
and provider under contract 
A mix of stable and unstable relations 
External learning, emphasis on quality control and productive processes 
as well as on innovative products. Example: JL 
7 Conclusion 
Companies in South China are quick learners in a usual catching-up strategy. They 
engage actively in looking abroad for sources of technology and seek actively to 
cooperate with foreign clients in order to have access to better technology. Their foreign 
cooperation is driven by this need for productive technology rather than a need to export. 
They seek these contacts through varied forms and channels, always maintaining the 
variety of foreign clients and arrangements. This ‘copy and fabrication’ strategy opens 
possibilities for larger production scale, better knowledge, and wider markets. The 
association with a foreign client is thus strategic to practically all companies that want to 
go up the value chain, to approach the technological frontier and to access the more 
lucrative markets.  
In Asia, the discussion centred on how companies upgrade from productive to 
technological capabilities. The South Korean experience shows the switch from basic 
productive capability to a more complex technological capability is linked, but not 
exclusively, to the introduction of R&D, to some organisational sophistication, and to the 
integration of technology and markets in the strategy of the firm (Kim, 2000). The 
models of learning that the Chinese enterprises are experiencing can trace their origins to 
this East Asian catching-up model (see for example the work of Hobday, 1997). In fact, 
what our research found is that learning in Chinese enterprises has not created a new 
paradigm for the learning literature. On the contrary, the learning experience of the 
Chinese enterprises is an ordinary process and the industrialisation of the South of China 
should be regarded as a normal catch-up case, even a follower of the Asian model.  
Even firms advancing more rapidly toward an innovation frontier are in this pragmatic, 
down-to-earth catching-up model, upgrading cumulatively productive and control 
knowledge. These firms introduce new models as long as their foreign clients provide 
them new blueprints. Firms that seem to enter in a transitional stage in upgrading from a 
basic productive learning to a more sophisticated technology learning maintain the same 
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diversified types of contacts with their clients, aggregating more sources of knowledge 
and trying to keep a multiplicity of external sources. These firms follow a mixed model 
of interactive learning, maintaining a variety of sources of technology, keeping a large 
portfolio of clients and products, accepting to be both OEM providers for some products 
and an autonomous brand for others, depending on the market.  
From an economic point of view, what is surprising is how such an ordinary 
technological learning based on a catching-up strategy at the firm level could lead to  
such an extraordinary fast industrialisation at the macro level, which is sometimes  
called ‘China Miracle’ (Lin et al., 2000). The answer might rely on the size of this 
common-type learning. When an ordinary learning behaviour spreads through thousands 
of all kinds of enterprises in an economy like the Chinese, the result would be like the 
consequences of a typical Chinese social movement, i.e., a mass outcome or a ‘miracle’. 
China, since the beginning of 1980s, has been carrying out a massive technological 
learning movement throughout its industrial firms based on the initiative of its new 
emerging companies. This process is far from finished and will reveal more surprises, a 
fertile ground for socio-economic analysis. 
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